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Taxation as Insurance
by John R. Brooks
A central yet often overlooked aspect of an
income tax is that it acts as insurance against the
risk of low income. Because a person’s payments to
government are a function of income, he can be
assured that in a time of low income, his tax
payments will decrease and transfers will increase,
while the standard benefits of governments con-
tinue to flow. Because everyone, no matter how
successful, faces some risk of lost income, that
assurance provides us an insurance benefit, even if
our income never actually drops.
This core feature of an income tax — and, really,
government in general — is frequently missing
from political, rhetorical, and even academic discus-
sions about taxation. This is an unfortunate over-
sight because incorporating insurance can have
important effects on political, economic, and moral
questions regarding taxation.
What Do Taxes Pay For?
A simple way to think of taxes is as the combi-
nation of two things. First, a taxpayer is buying
public services such as schools, roads, police, na-
tional defense, healthcare, and financial regulation.
Thus, one part of a person’s tax bill is simply the
cost of those services. But it is extremely unlikely
that any person pays exactly the value of the
benefits received (even if we could precisely mea-
sure those benefits). Most everyone will pay either
more or less than the value of those benefits. That’s
the second element — redistribution. Those paying
more than the value of benefits received are redis-
tributing some resources to those who pay less than
the value of benefits received.
This is true even for someone who pays no taxes;
that person is effectively buying public services but
then receiving an offsetting transfer, funded by
those who pay more than the value of the benefits
they receive.
This bifurcation does not answer many of the
difficult questions in tax policy, of course, not the
least of which is trying to figure out what the value
of the goods received is. It may not be hard to value
food stamps or Social Security transfers, but what
about clean air, property rights, and the rule of law?
Also difficult is deciding where to draw the line
between what is purchasing a benefit and what is
redistributing a benefit to someone else. Many
things that look like transfers also contain at least
some direct benefit to the transferor. Paying for
another person’s healthcare, education, food, and
housing help to create a more healthy, educated,
productive, and stable society, which benefits the
transferor directly (even ignoring any normative
preferences). How much benefit relative to the total
cost is an open question, but it is certainly not zero.
But even if we account for all of those spillover
benefits, there is still a category of benefit that we
haven’t accounted for: insurance.
Income Insurance
Set aside taxes for a minute and imagine a
different program. Suppose there was something
called ‘‘income insurance’’ that you could purchase
in the market. The insurance would pay out some
fraction of lost income if you, for whatever reason,
earned less than you were expected to. You would
purchase the insurance by paying a regular, actu-
arially fair premium based on your income risk.
(Assume for now that an insurance company could
actually measure things like ‘‘expected income’’ and
‘‘income risk.’’ Let’s also ignore any adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard problems.)
Would you buy that insurance? Let me ask that
another way: Would you buy that insurance in a
world where the government performed no redistribution
at all? In that world, everyone is forced to pay
exactly the value of the benefits they receive from
government, no more, no less. If you lost your
income for some reason, that would be financially
devastating: You’d have no income plus a big un-
paid bill from the government. I’d buy the insur-
ance. We buy insurance against all sorts of other
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risks that could leave us financially devastated,
including health insurance, life insurance, disability
insurance, and property insurance. This seems like
a natural extension.
So let’s say you buy that insurance. But nothing
happens this year — your income stays the same, so
no payout. All you’ve done is cut a check for the
premium to the insurance company, which it uses to
pay the claims of those who did have income loss.
Is that redistribution? In a literal sense, yes — the
money you paid in is literally distributed to some-
one else. But I don’t think of life insurance as
redistribution in the public finance sense. I think of
it as buying a product that benefits me, namely risk
reduction. The same should be true for our income
insurance product. Indeed, if this is just a market
transaction in our thought experiment, it’s axiom-
atic that it benefits me. I wouldn’t have purchased it
otherwise.
If this is true, it must be that some of what looks
like redistribution in our tax system is really just
purchasing insurance. Our system doesn’t force you
to pay the cost of all the government benefits you
receive no matter what — those benefits continue
even if you can’t afford to pay them. Not only that,
some additional transfers often kick in, such as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and
Medicaid.
That additional transfers occur in periods of low
income is no surprise — there’s a reason we call
those programs ‘‘social insurance.’’ But it’s not just
that. Even if we didn’t have specific transfers to
low-income individuals, there would still be an
insurance benefit simply from not having to pay
taxes. Recall the thought experiment above. If your
tax bill drops because of low income but
government-provided goods and services — clean
air, national defense, and the rule of law — continue
to flow, you are getting a transfer because of your
low income, paid for in part by the taxes you paid
during periods of higher income. It follows that part
of your tax bill — above and beyond an accounting
of all other benefits received — includes some
premium for the purchase of the income insurance
embedded in the income tax. That amount is thus
based not on some normative, other-regarding de-
sire for a particular distribution of resources but
rather on a self-regarding desire to protect oneself
from the risk of low income. That is a benefit to the
taxpayer herself.
Another way to see that income taxation has an
insurance element is to compare the pretax volatil-
ity of income with the post-tax (and post-transfer)
volatility of income. The system effectively narrows
the range — reduces the variance — of possible
after-tax incomes compared with pretax incomes.1 If
an individual turns out to have high pretax income,
her after-tax income will be somewhat less; if she
turns out to have low pretax income, her after-tax
(and after-transfer) income will be somewhat more.
Reducing the variance of possible outcomes is pre-
cisely what insurance does, by shifting that risk
onto an insurer and thereby spreading it among all
the insured. In this case some income risk is shifted
onto the government itself, and thus, it doesn’t go
away. But the government is more able to insure
against income risk than individuals are (for ex-
ample, by borrowing cheaply), and it can be a
mechanism for intergenerational risk-sharing (also
through borrowing). Again, that shifting creates a
real benefit to the taxpayer herself.
Income Risk and the Role of Luck
If there is an insurance benefit from taxation,
how big is it? What is the appropriate ‘‘premium’’
to pay for that income insurance? That’s unanswer-
able in any rigorous way, but it will depend on how
much income risk an individual faces. Many people
seem to believe that their income is simply an
inevitable result of their industry and creativity and
not subject to any risk — but that’s clearly false. Bill
Gates could have had a stroke on his way to his first
meeting with IBM in 1980. Even a person whose
income never drops still faces real risk. That one’s
income doesn’t drop is not evidence that it couldn’t
drop. A high-income person should be no less
frustrated by high taxes than a healthy person
should be from his purchase of health insurance.
Just because the person doesn’t need expensive
medical care doesn’t mean the insurance was a
waste. Indeed, that person comes out ahead — she
has her health and the comfort from insuring
against downside risk. The same is true for a
high-income person paying for income insurance
through the income tax — she has her high income
and the comfort from insuring against total devas-
tation and loss of government services if her income
drops.
To be clear, even after accounting for this insur-
ance benefit, the income tax likely still has purely
redistributive transfers. The highest-income indi-
viduals are very likely paying amounts beyond the
value of all the benefits received from government,
including the insurance benefit. But trying to tease
out exactly what is insurance and what is redistri-
bution is a difficult task, particularly because we
would need to estimate ex ante income risk but can
1A more apples-to-apples comparison would be to compare
the volatility of after-tax income from an income tax with
after-tax income from a lump sum tax that raises the same
revenue.
COMMENTARY / POLICY PERSPECTIVE
1862 TAX NOTES, June 27, 2016
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
(C) Tax Analysts 2016. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
only observe ex post results. And income risk is a
much trickier concept to isolate compared with, for
example, accident risk or life expectancy (particu-
larly if we bring back in adverse selection and
moral hazard concerns).
One way to phrase the question is to ask: How
much of our income or wealth is based on pure
luck, as opposed to intelligence, skills, or effort?
Some studies have suggested that much of our
income cannot be explained by the typical features,
such as education, skills, and effort, meaning that
much of it is attributable to chance. (And I suggest
that the briefest observation of people you know
will demonstrate that income does not correlate
perfectly with intelligence, education, skills, and
industry.)
But what does luck mean in this context? The
notion that there is a large degree of chance in the
outcomes of life is hardly a new or surprising
observation. Moral philosophers have made that
point repeatedly. In the modern era, the idea that
life outcomes are in large part due to a lottery is
most associated with John Rawls, who famously
argued that even traits like intelligence and ability
are distributed by chance when judged from a point
before any of us are born.2 The same could be said
for where, to whom, and even when we are born. If
all of that is attributed to chance, the variation in
incomes merely because of active choices made
during a person’s life is relatively small.
But we don’t necessarily have to step behind the
veil of ignorance to believe that there is a large
amount of uncertainty in income. Even individuals
with roughly the same traits, education, family
wealth, career choice, and so on can and do exhibit
a wide variation in income. Several studies have
found that income volatility is relatively high and
has increased since the 1970s.3 While some of that
volatility may be attributable to choices by indi-
viduals and households, a decent chunk of it is
likely to simply be luck.
Academic Literature
If you believe, as I do, that there is a decent
amount of luck involved in determining our in-
comes and that the tax system mitigates some of the
effects of that luck (on the upside and downside),
the idea that taxation plays an insurance role fol-
lows naturally. Thus, it is somewhat surprising how
rarely this idea enters academic discussions and
models. In the economics literature, papers by Hal
R. Varian and by Jonathan Eaton and Harvey S.
Rosen in 1980 find that if labor income is uncertain,
an income tax may be efficient even if a lump sum
tax is available.4 Varian, in particular, finds that
optimal marginal tax rates on the higher earners
could be high in that case, in contrast to J.A.
Mirrlees’s result of declining rates (in which he
assumes that earnings ability is fixed).5 Some pa-
pers followed that work, but by 2008, Louis Kaplow
could still write that ‘‘the general problem of opti-
mal income taxation in the presence of [income]
uncertainty has not been the subject of extensive
study.’’6
In Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines Jr.’s
chapter on taxation and economic efficiency the
Handbook of Public Economics, they state (in a foot-
note):
One potentially important market failure not
considered by this chapter is the incomplete-
ness of markets in state-contingent claims that
might otherwise be used to diversify risks. In
such a setting, it is possible for taxation to
improve welfare simply by reducing (after-
tax) private returns — since the government
can pool risks through its tax and spending
actions.7 [Emphasis added.]
In a 2011 paper, Hilary W. Hoynes and Erzo F.P.
Luttmer quantify the insurance value of state tax-
and-transfer programs. They find that the insurance
value of state taxes is positive and rising with
income, which they say may help to explain why
there is relatively little out-migration by high-
income people from high-tax states.8
The legal literature is also relatively thin, at least
beyond high-level adoptions of Rawlsian concep-
tions of justice. I apply the taxation-as-insurance
idea to fiscal federalism, asking whether a state or
2See Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118 et seq. (1971).
3See, e.g., Donggyun Shin and Gary Solon, ‘‘Trends in Men’s
Earnings Volatility: What Does the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics Show?’’ 95 J. Pub. Econ. 973 (2011); Karen Dynan,
Douglas Elmendorf, and Daniel Sichel, ‘‘The Evolution of
Household Income Volatility,’’ 12 B.E. J. Econ. Anal. & Pol’y 1
(2008). But see Wojciech Kopczuk, Emmanuel Saez, and Jae
Song, ‘‘Earnings Inequality and Mobility in the United States:
Evidence From Social Security Data Since 1937,’’ 125 Q.J. Econ.
125 (2010) (finding relatively low and stable volatility).
4Varian, ‘‘Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance,’’ 14 J.
Pub. Econ. 49 (1980); and Eaton and Rosen, ‘‘Optimal Redistribu-
tive Taxation and Uncertainty,’’ 95 Q.J. Econ. 357 (1980).
5See Mirrlees, ‘‘An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum
Income Taxation,’’ 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971).
6Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 118
(2008). Kaplow is somewhat skeptical of the ability of an income
tax to function as insurance in part because the government will
run into some of the same moral hazard problems that private
insurance would — which is simply just another way of
describing the labor-leisure distortion. Id. at 119.
7Auerbach and Hines, ‘‘Taxation and Economic Efficiency,’’
in Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds., 3 Handbook of Public
Economics 1362 n.8 (2002).
8Hoynes and Luttmer, ‘‘The Insurance Value of State Tax-
and-Transfer Programs,’’ 95 J. Pub. Econ. 1466 (2011).
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federal government is better at absorbing individu-
als’ income risk through the tax system (spoiler: it’s
the federal government).9 Edward D. Kleinbard in
his book We Are Better Than This10 urges progres-
sives to move away from the rhetoric of redistribu-
tion in part because much of what we think of as
redistribution is really social insurance. Linda Sugin
has also engaged with the tax-as-insurance notion.11
Even when focusing explicitly on government’s
role as an insurer, the tax system can sometimes be
forgotten. David A. Moss’s excellent book When All
Else Fails12 shows how government and legal insti-
tutions have worked to shift and spread risk in
ways that have been central to our economic evo-
lution. He discusses things such as limited liability
for corporations, the bankruptcy system, the mon-
etary system, Social Security, unemployment insur-
ance, and disaster relief — but not the tax system
itself. Recall again the central point I made above:
Even if the government does not provide any
explicit social insurance, there is insurance value
simply from not having to pay the per-capita cost of
running a state if income drops.
Conclusion
Why doesn’t the academic literature, or political
discussion, more closely consider the insurance
value of taxation? A possible reason is that it’s very
hard to measure income risk, and it can change a lot
over a person’s lifetime. There is very likely a
degree of path dependence to income, particularly
following early investments in human capital,
meaning that the probability distribution for a
person’s income may tighten over time. Further,
many wealthy people are essentially self-insured
through a combination of financial and human
capital, and so they may not value the income tax’s
insurance role even if they still face income risk.
But the difficulty of measuring income risk does
not imply that it doesn’t exist or that there is no
insurance value from income taxation. Even if we
can’t fully decouple insurance from redistribution,
and even if it’s different for each person, it’s still in
there somewhere, and analysts and policymakers
should more explicitly take it into account.
9John R. Brooks, ‘‘Fiscal Federalism as Risk-Sharing: The
Insurance Role of Redistributive Taxation,’’ 68 Tax L. Rev. 89
(2014).
10Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This: How Government Should
Spend Our Money 327-333 (2015).
11See, e.g., Sugin, ‘‘A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal
Tax Model,’’ 64 Tax L. Rev. 229 (2011).
12Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk
Manager (2002).
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